Somalia Conflict: Analyzing the UN-led peace process of 1993 and the challenges

Somalia may be said to be synonymous to conflict and civil unrest. A country located in the Horn of Africa with a population of 15 million people, Somalia has been subjected to over 20 years of civil unrest and power tussle conflicts among leaders of different factions. Although several peace processes and initiatives through regional mediation and international intervention have taken place within the country, Somalia still wriggles till today through the over two decades’ conflict. This essay hopes to shine the spotlight on the various peace processes and interventions, as well as their challenges.

· Background of the conflict

According to research, the Somali conflict dates to 1988. The Somali National Movement (SNM) had launched an attack — an armed insurgency against government forces in the north of the country in a bid to overthrow the government. However, in response to the attacks, Government counterattacks in the region led to massive scores of displacement and casualties. Consequently, the crisis took a different turn and worsened as multiple clan-based liberation movements emerged against the repressive regime.

· Primary and secondary parties

Over the years, the conflict in Somalia has taken different dimensions. As a result, it has become hard to pinpoint a particular party involved in the conflict as many parties have emerged. This is underpinned by the changing nature of the conflict and different conflicting interests of faction leaders.

Initially, the parties involved in the conflict were the government and the Somali National Movement (SNM). But the conflict escalated to full-blown warfare among leaders of various factions: these are the United Somali Congress (USC); SSDF; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM); the Somali National Union (SNU) the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and the Somali-African Muki Organisation (SAMO) amongst others. As of 1993, there were about 15 different warring factions already from about 6 faction groups in 1991.

However, the primary parties involved in the mediation process were the United Nations and two of the powerful faction leaders: Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aideed. While the secondary parties were the leaders of the other factions.

· Mediation attempts

A series of peace processes have been embarked on in the war-torn country. However, none was able to record a considerable success. The peace processes began in 1991, with about seven fully-fledged mediation processes/conferences aimed at restoring peace in the region through political stabilization; a strategy many literatures have condemned as the fundamental basis for the failures of the processes. They argue that peacebuilding and state-building are two conflicting issues that should be approached critically. However, let us consider the peculiarity of the several peace processes.

1. Djibouti Talks

The first was the Djibouti Talks held from June to July 1991. Convening leaders of six warring factions — the United Somali Congress (USC); the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM); the Somali-African Muki Organisation (SAMO); the Somali National Union (SNU); the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and the SSDF, the conference was a set of negotiations aimed at establishing an interim government in the country. As a result, Ali Mahdi was declared interim President. But the declaration was rejected by his internal USC (United Somali Congress) rival, General Mohamed Farah Aideed. The discord between the two figures, each supported by different clans, led to political tussle which resulted in violent armed conflict destroying the capital Mogadishu in 1991.

According to literature, one of the reasons why the accord reached could not be implemented was the lack of comprehensive representation and lack of control over the militias by the delegates.

2. Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Talks

The Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Talks took place in January and March of 1993. An initiative of the UN intervention in Somalia (UNOSOM), it was also to bring about political stability in the country. The aim of the peace talk was to set-up a two-year interim government. About 15 clan-based factions were convened — the SSDF; the United Somali Congress (USC); the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM); the Somali-African Muki Organisation (SAMO); the USF; the Somali National Union (SNU); the SNDU; the SDM-SNA; the SDA; the SNA; the SNF; the SPM-SNA; the USC-SWA; the SSNM and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). They signed an agreement “on disarmament and security; rehabilitation and reconstruction; the restoration of property and settlement of disputes; and the establishment of a two-year transitional authority” (Mark 2009, p. 18). The Addis Ababa Talks also committed the leaders of the 15 factions to a national reconciliation process and a procedure for establishing a Transitional National Council (TNC)” (Mark 2009, p.18). The TNC was to be appointed by district councils established through grassroots dialogue. However, the outcome of the Addis Ababa Talks was short-lived as it produced a rather rushed and poorly worded agreement, leading to fierce tension between UN peacekeepers and some warring factions, notably one of the powerful faction leaders, General Mohamed Farah Aideed. The bone of contention was whether the establishment of regional and district councils was to be controlled by factions or be a bottom-up approach. The armed conflict that broke out following this further derailed the mission of the UN peace mission in Somalia and halted the implementation of the agreement.

3. The Sodere Conference

Convened by a neighbouring country, Ethiopia, the Sodere Conference took place from 1996 to 1997. The conference had the aim of reviving a decentralized federal state in the country. It was successful to some extent as it introduced the principle of fixed proportional representation by clan — the ‘4.5 formula’ that came to be used subsequently in the country.

4. The Cairo Conference

The Cairo Conference in 1997 was convened by Egypt. Contrary to the Sodere Conference, the aim of the conference was to bring about a centralized Somali state — what later led to the concentration and elevation of power in the hands of the faction leaders. This led to the total boycotting of the agreement signed at the Sodere Conference. However, two coalitions emerged from the Sodere and Cairo talks; these coalitions in subsequent years formed the basis for the main political divisions in Somalia.

5. Arta Peace Conference

The Arta Peace Conference which took place in 2000 was convened by Djibouti, another neighbouring country. While other conference focused on bringing together faction leaders as a tactic to promote peace in the region, the Arta Peace Conference brought civic leaders to the talks. The Conference was able to achieve an important breakthrough. It produced a 3-year power-sharing agreement to introduce a Transitional National Government (TNG). According to some scholars, the success of the Arta Conference could be attributed to the change in strategy — the consultation with civic leaders, clan elders and businessmen which was beyond the usual faction leaders. The new strategy that was employed in the Arta process gave the civic leaders, clan elders and businessmen the first opportunity to play a significant role as decision-makers. Similarly, Mark (2009, p. 17) opines that “By adopting the so-called ‘4.5 formula’ for proportional representation of Somali clans in government, it produced a power-sharing agreement to establish a Transitional National Government (TNG), with a Transitional Charter for government, and a significant degree of national legitimacy”. However, the outcome faced numerous domestic oppositions, notably the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), an alliance of faction and political leaders, and never became operational. The failure of the TNG was due to losing the confidence of the people as it was trailed by many accusations of clannism and corruption.

6. The Mbagathi Conference

Sponsored by a regional organization, IGAD, the Mbagathi conference was held in Kenya between 2002 and 2004. The aim was to produce a successor to the failed TNG that was produced at the Arta Peace Conference. The conference brought together militia and political leaders to the talks, but not civic leaders to promote a federalist state. One of the topical issues discussed was the resolution of the conflict; this was used as a tactic to prevent the talks from merely focusing on a power-sharing accord. However, it never gained the much-expected traction.

Nevertheless, the Mbagathi conference brought about the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in late 2004 as well as the election of President Abdullahi Yusuf which garnered a lot of controversies. The controversies caused major divisions within the TFG, with many Somalis questioning the legitimacy of representation at the conference. As a result, the TFG struggled for subsequent years to enthrone a functional government in the region as well as to advance major transitional processes.

7. The Kampala Accord

Although, the outcome of the Mbagathi Conference was successful to a large extent with the TFG lasting till 2011. But it failed to advance key transitional tasks in the country. This led to the Kampala accord that was held in 2012 in Uganda in order to address the issues and agree on the way forward in bringing an end to the “transition in a spirit of cooperation and harmony.”1 The accord which was facilitated by the UN and the president of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Maseveni brought together political leaders to discuss the way forward.

However, haven highlighted the different mediation processes in Somalia, this essay will focus on the UN-facilitated mediation process in Addis Ababa in 1993. The essay exploring theoretical approaches to international conflicts will examine the strategies and issues encountered by the mediators in the Addis Abba peace talks.

• The mediation strategy and tactics

One of the strategies employed by the UNOSOM was to bring together the warring faction lords to discuss peace and reconcile their differences with the idea of the power-sharing conference. To also build trust and confidence in the process, the peace talk was held in Ethiopia. There was no ‘neutral’ ground within Somalia to host a peace conference. This was because of the complete nature of state collapse in the country and the destruction of cities.

They also employed the tactics of committing the leaders of the 15 factions to a national reconciliation process and a procedure for establishing a Transitional National Council (TNC). The objective was to reach a disarmament and ceasefire agreement as well as the complete handover of weapons to the UN

• Positions and interest.

The position of the faction leaders was to oversee the governance in Somalia, with an interest to control the resources, as well as the territory. However, considering the war which led to famine and major humanitarian crisis in the country, the United Nations Intervention in Somalia (UNOSOM) had the goal of de-escalating the conflicts. One of the ways it hoped to do this was through the reconciliation of fighting parties as well as reviving and stabilizing the countries failed political system.

· Timing

Unlike subsequent mediation processes in the country, the UN-brokered Conference on National Reconciliation lasted a period of about 3 months.

· The Challenges

Although, the conflict in Somalia didn’t receive international attention from the outset — an issue many scholars have opined contributed to the worsening of the conflict, the changing nature of the conflict was one of the major challenges to the mediation in the country. What started between 1988 and 1991 as a political conflict between an armed opposition (the SNM) and the government developed to a much more complex and fragmentized conflict, with different factions mobilizing on clan lines and fighting over not just political power, but resources. This posed a difficult situation for mediators to track and respond to the new developments as they arose. Similarly, on the part of the mediators, it was evident that there was a lack of clear-cut strategy to navigate changes in the conflict and be flexible or adapt to the changing nature of the conflict. This was an obstacle to sustaining the negotiated settlement.

Additionally, the lack of government and ‘neutral’ location to broker peace within Somalia created a bottleneck for mediators. This was a challenge as there was no key actor with whom the mediators could engage. According to Ken (2007, p. 41) “the absence of the state removes a key actor and a political-legal framework that mediators are accustomed to working with”. Similarly, Mark (2009; p. 21) posits that “the existence of established and rooted regional polities in Somaliland and Puntland presents fundamental challenges in approaching Somalia as a unitary state within a single diplomatic framework.” Also, the displacement of people as well as the occupation and destruction of cities including the capital, Mogadishu indicates that there was no ‘neutral’ venue to host peace talks.

Another notable challenge was the shift in interest or lack of attention to the underlying interests of the mediation processes. While many of the peace conferences were called ‘reconciliation’, their primary aim was to secure political stabilization through power-sharing agreements, rather than peaceful reconciliation of differences among the warring factions. For example, the 1993 Addis Ababa Conference was focused more on power-sharing deals but had no substantial provisions for reconciliation. Similarly, although while attention was placed on reconciliation as an informal activity, the Arta Talks of 2000 also placed much emphasis on power-sharing. Meanwhile, the Mbagathi peace process was aimed at addressing major conflict issues in the country, but it also failed as it prioritized the interests of the leaders and moved to power-sharing. Time and again, it has been proved in many negotiation and mediation literature that lack of attention to underlying interests is often costly. Because choosing position over interest could make mediators box themselves up in those positions (Fisher et al, 2012; 4). This was evident in the Somali peace process with less emphasis placed on peaceful reconciliation. The effect of this on the mediation processes was the confusion and debate of who to give power to between the faction leaders or civic leaders.

Also, the lack of trust in the international mediation process by the Somali people and perceived misplace priority of the conference agenda also created a major challenge. The question of what issues the peace processes should address became a public debate, with some Somali groups clamouring for the peace process to include “accountability for war crimes, occupation of land, and compensation for lost lives and stolen property, while others sought a narrower agenda focusing on power-sharing and revival of the state.” (Mark, 2009; p. 22). Most of the mediation processes like the Addis Ababa talks led by the UN focused on building a transitional government, a peace charter, and a road map for elections in the country. But, this raised widespread concerns over war crimes by parties involved in the talks and the lack of a transitional justice system in the mediation process, leading to lack of trust in the outcomes of the mediation; the Somali public saw the legitimacy of governments in which the alleged war criminals play key roles as weak, and the supposed reconciliation talks and support for good governance as unserious. One of the fundamental principles of peace processes is being able to foster trust across different parties involved in a conflict. Nevertheless, not being able to build trust with the Somali people on the part of the mediators led to major flaws of the peace processes. Similarly, there was a lack of trust among the faction leaders involved in the Addis Ababa talks, leading to reneging of the negotiated agreement. Declaring one of the faction leaders an interim president created a winner and loser outcome, making the other parties feel weaker and further creating an enemy image amongst them. According to Aggestam (2002; p. 72), “the perseverance of enemy images and a lack of trust tend to increase fear and make a reactive devaluation of an agreement more likely.”

There was also the issue of mediator bias and by extension, the interests of external actors that further contributed to the complexity of the peace processes in Somalia. The engagement of regional states was driven as much by their own security and economic interests than by a concern to end Somalia’s political divisions (Healy 2008). One example of this is Ethiopia, one of the regional mediators opposing the Arta peace talks and its outcome — TNG, in part because it was supported by its strategic rival, Egypt and engaged opposition figures from its allies Somaliland and Puntland. It also created an issue of lack of support for mediation. According to Mark (2009, P. 26), effective diplomacy requires a long term and sustained commitment. Similarly, according to many literatures, disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea’s military support for armed opposition groups, and the US counter-terrorism strategies in Somalia were all drivers of conflict and obstacles to peace in the country.

One other important factor that contributed to the failure of the Addis Ababa talks was time pressure; it was short-lived, in part due to time pressure. The issue of time pressure, as well as external political pressure, gave parties the opportunity to renege on the signed agreement, claiming it was “forced” on them. Time pressure in the process of negotiation or mediation usually leads to the issue of poorly worded or ambiguous agreements and this was evident in the Addis Ababa conference. Aggestam (2002; p. 72) posits that “ambiguous agreements during the negotiation process, may in a post-agreement phase create new grounds for hostilities as these ambiguities need to be addressed, interpreted and agreed upon.”

· Missed opportunities and lessons learnt

One of the key lessons learnt was the absence of early intervention and engagement with warring parties in the Somalia Conflict which resulted in the culmination of a power struggle fight to multiple clan-based warfares. The conflict which started in 1988 didn’t get attention until 1992. Additionally, there was no better communication strategy by the mediators. To build trust in a negotiating or mediation process, there is a need for a clear-cut communication strategy with the parties involved. Similarly, there was also the inadequate use of the media to garner trust among the Somali people. An extensive media coverage of the peace process could have helped to win the trust of the Somali people who thought their interest was not being pursued. Restoring the people’s trust and confidence in governance as a strategy in the peace process could have helped garner support for the UN mission in Somalia. According to Mark (2009; P. 5) “Rebuilding a country after war is fundamentally about rebuilding relationships at all levels, restoring the people’s trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, and providing the population with greater hope for the future.”

It is also important that mediators have a more flexible approach and strategies in manoeuvring the changing nature of conflicts. The dynamic nature of the Somalia Conflict was a major problem for the mediators. It showed the importance of flexibility in dealing with conflicts that tend to be fluid. The conflict also showed that there was a misunderstanding of representation between the mediators and what the Somali people desire as representation. There was the question of whether power should be concentrated at the centre or decentralized as well as if power should be shared amongst the militias or civic leaders. This became a hard nut for the mediators to crack as the different mediation conferences failed to understand the people’s idea of representation. There was the debate of what types of leadership within each delegation should be allocated power or privileged– militia and political leaders, clan elders, civil society leaders, business executives or a combination of all? According to literature on negotiation and mediation, the context of the conflict; nature of the dispute and parties; and the situation on the ground are some of the major factors that influence conflict and peace actors’ choice of methods in de-escalating conflicts and brokering peace. The conflict repeatedly showed that while reconciliation was often viewed by the Somali people as a positive-sum process, the revival and establishment of a central government was viewed as a zero-sum exercise, involving winners and losers between those who control the state and their rivals who fear that state apparatus could be used as a tool of domination. In reality, this is the historical political experience of the country and many Somalis saw the state as a predator and not an enabler of governance that the mediators thought. However, inventing ways to reduce the perceived threat of a revived central government amongst the constituencies could have been a vital game-changer in Somalia i.e ensuring security guarantees to the constituencies and providing an effective transitional constitution or rule of law defining and limiting the authority of the state. This could have helped in addressing the people’s concern and by extension the conflict in the country.

Similarly, the focus of the peace conferences was skewed as they were based power-sharing mechanisms over actual conflict resolution; it was more focused on allocating power positions by clan and faction; leading to renewed warfare among the faction leaders who felt marginalized instead of bringing them together. Aggestam (2002; p. 72) opined that “the continuation of a structural asymmetry of power, whether military, economic or political, increases risks of renewed warfare in the implementation phase.” The peace processes should have focused more on promoting the reconciliation of key conflict issues as a precondition for power-sharing discussions.

Finally, the mediation processes showed the importance of coherence in mediating an agreement between aggrieved parties. There was a need for improved coherence when drawing up agreements. For example, the major factor that led to the failure of the Addis Ababa peace conference, apart from time pressure was lack of coherence in the signed agreement. Clearly stating the powers of parties involved could have gone a long way in making the Addis Ababa peace talks a success. Also, unified external support for mediators would have helped in de-escalating the conflict in the country. One of the problems was the identification of an effective mediator; the mediators were not really seen as neutral by the Somali people. However, if the international community had made concerted efforts to provide solidarity to the mediation process, it could have helped win the confidence of the Somali people i.e the Addis Ababa conference.

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1The Kampala Accord, 2011.